The vocabulary of philosophy, mental, moral, and metaphysical : with quotations and references for the use of students / by William Fleming ; edited by Henry Calderwood.

Date:
1876
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Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: The vocabulary of philosophy, mental, moral, and metaphysical : with quotations and references for the use of students / by William Fleming ; edited by Henry Calderwood. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh. The original may be consulted at the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh.

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    VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY. ANALOGUE (duxMyo;, proportionate).—“ By [an Analogue ig meant an organ in one animal having the same function as a different organ in a different animal. The difference between Homologue and Analogue may be illustrated by the wing of a bird and that of a butterfly : as the two totally differ in anatomical structure, they cannot be said to be homologous, but they are analogous in function, since they both serve for flight.”—M'Cosh, Typical Forms, p. 25. In Logic a term is analogous whose single signification applies with equal propriety to more than one object—as the leg of the table, the leg of the animal.—Whately, Log., bk. iii. sec. 10. ANALOGY (ai/esAoy/flf, proportion). [An argument from Analogy is a defensive argument drawn from similarity cf pheno- mena recognised in different relations. It is not constructive in nature, being competent only for defence, not for proof.— Bd.] It has been defined, “ The similarity of ratios or relations.” In popular language we extend the word to resemblances of things as well as relations. Employed as an argument, analogy depends upon the canon, the same attributes may be assigned to distinct, but similar things, provided they can be shown to accompany the points of resemblance in the things, and not the points of difference.” —Thomson, Laws of Thought, p. 363, 1st ed. “Analogy does not mean the similarity of two things, but the similarity, or sameness of two relations. There must be more than two things to give rise to two relations; there must be at least three, and in most cases there are four. Thus A may be like B, but there is no analogy between A and B: it is an abuse of the word to speak so, and it leads to much confusion of thought. If A has the same re- lation to B which C has to D, then there is an analogy. It the first relation be well known, it may serve to explain the second, which is less known; and the transfer of name from one of the terms in the relation best known to its corre- sponding term in the other, causes no confusion, but on the contrary tends to remind us of the similarity that exists in these relations, and so assists the mind instead of misleading it.”—Coplestone, Four Discourses, p. 122, 8vo, London, 1821. “ Analogy implies a difference in sort, and not merely in degree; and it is the sameness of the end with the difference
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