The vocabulary of philosophy, mental, moral, and metaphysical : with quotations and references for the use of students / by William Fleming ; edited by Henry Calderwood.
- Date:
- 1876
Licence: Public Domain Mark
Credit: The vocabulary of philosophy, mental, moral, and metaphysical : with quotations and references for the use of students / by William Fleming ; edited by Henry Calderwood. Source: Wellcome Collection.
Provider: This material has been provided by the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh. The original may be consulted at the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh.
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![WILL— discover a power, which, though intimately connected with the other attributes of mind, even as they are closely related to each other, does yet stand out distinctly from them, with its peculiar functions and its own province. We hold that there cannot be an] undertaking more perilous to the best interests of philosophy and humanity, than the attempt to resolve the will into anything inferior to itself. In particular it may be, and should be distinguished from that with which it has been so often confounded, the emotional part of man’s nature.” That each man is, as regards his own acts, an originating cause not determined by other causes, is Aristotle’s view throughout.—Aristotle’s Ethics, Grant, ii. 114. According to Ritter (Hist, of Anc. Philosoph., vol. iii. p. 555), “ it was a principle with the Stoics that mil and desire are one with thought, and may be resolved into it.” Hence their saying, Ornne actum est in intellectu. And hence they maintained that passion was just an erroneous judgment. But this is to confound faculties which are distinct. By the intellect we know or understand, by the sensitivity we feel or desire, and by the will we determine to do or not to do, to do this or to do that. Intellectus est prior voluntate, non enim est voluntas nisi de bono intellecto.—Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol., ii. 1, qusest. 83. Ea qucc sunt in intellectu sunt principia eorum quce sunt in affectu, in quantum scilicet bonum intellectum movet affectum.— Ibidem, ii. 2, (pitest. 7, art. 2. “Whether or no the judgment does certainly and infallibly command and draw after it the acts of the will, this is certain, it does of necessity precede them, and no man can fix his love upon anything till his judgment reports it to the will as amiable.”—South, Sermon on Matt. x. 37. On the question, whether the connection between the intellect and the will be direct or indirect, see Locke, Essay on Hum. Understand., bk. i. ch. 21 ; Jonathan Edwards, Inquiry, part i. sec. 2 ; Dr. Turnbull, Christ. Philosoph., p. 196. Will (Freedom of).—“ This is the essential attribute of a will, and contained in the very idea, that whatever determines the ivill acquires this power from a previous determination of the will itself. The will is ultimately self-determined, or it is](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b2199531x_0536.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
