A lecture on the relation of madness to crime : delivered at the London Institution, February 28, 1884 / by J.C. Bucknill.
- John Charles Bucknill
- Date:
- [1884]
Licence: Public Domain Mark
Credit: A lecture on the relation of madness to crime : delivered at the London Institution, February 28, 1884 / by J.C. Bucknill. Source: Wellcome Collection.
Provider: This material has been provided by The Royal College of Surgeons of England. The original may be consulted at The Royal College of Surgeons of England.
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![the proposition that the eft’ect of disease upon the emotions and the will can never, under any circumstances, affect the criminality of the acts of persons so afflicted, is so surprising, and would, if strictly enforced, have such monstrous consequences, that something more than an im- plied assertion of it seems necessary before it is admitted to be part of the law of England” (p. 159). Again, he says that, “carefully considered, they [that is, the judges' answers] leave untouched the most difficult questions connected with the subject, and lay down propositions liable to be misunderstood, though they might, and I think ought, to be construed in a way which would dispose satisfactorily of all cases whatever, ” The propositions, as construed by Mr. Justice Stephen, certainly offer a remarkable ex- ample of legal dialectic. Thus construed, wi’ong may mean either illegally or morally wrong, and knowledge may mean a calm judgment of the circumstances and consequences of the act. If it be really possible to construe the propositions of the judges as Justice Stephen thinks they might and ought to be construed, I can well believe that “to read judicial decisions correctly is,” as he says, “an art in itself, to be acquired only by long professional practice, aided by rules well known to lawyers, but unknown to medical men. ” But I am happy to say the art of construing does not satisfy the sound common sense of Mr. Justice Stephen, who concludes his efforts in that direction by * distinct proposition of his own as to what ought to be the law of England, which is as different as well can be from that which is the law, I have come, then, to the end of this part of my task, and I claim to have proved, not from the theories and imperfect knowledge of medical men, but out of the mouths of the great judges of the land, that the law of the land is, to use one of their mildest terms, ‘ ‘ insufficiently expressedand, to use a stronger term, that, if strictly enforced, it would lead to “monstrous consequences.” It would, indeed, lead to frequent acts of the most cruel injustice. With much pleasure, I now- pass with Mr. Justice Stephen to the consideration of what the law ought to be. He says : “ The proposition, then, wdiich I have to maintain and explain, ia that, if it is not, it ought to be the law of England, that no act is a crime, if the person who does it is, at the time when it is done, pre- vented, either by defective mental power or by any disease affecting his mind, from controlling his own conduct, unless the absence of the power of control has been produced by his own default.” I entirely Slgree with the idea contained in this proposition, but I think it would be difficult to put a good and true idea into language more open to dispute. What is meant by defective mental power which is not conditioned by disease ? Is it mere folly which is meant, or is it idiocy, which, as Chief Justice Cockburn pointed out, is omitted from the present law? “No provision is made for original malorganisation ; in other words, for idiocy” (Memorandum, 1874). What is meant by “the absence of the power of self-control, produced by the prisoner’s own default?” If states of intoxication be meant, they ought to be specified. But, if states of real insanity, caused by wil habits of life of any kind, are meant—as by the context I am led](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b22369508_0011.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
