An essay on the powers and mechanism of nature; : intended, by a deeper analysis of physical principles, to extend, improve, and more firmly establish, the grand superstructure of the Newtonian system. / By Robert Young.

  • Young, Robert
Date:
M DCC LXXXVIII. [1788]
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: An essay on the powers and mechanism of nature; : intended, by a deeper analysis of physical principles, to extend, improve, and more firmly establish, the grand superstructure of the Newtonian system. / By Robert Young. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    102/374 (page 74)
    / C 74 ] But it was neceflary to prove motion not to be ACTION, in order to exclude fecondarycaufes, and eftablifli the notion of the dire6l agency of Deity ; Berkley therefore argues in this chain : ‘‘ Firft, “ Are we not paffive in all our fenfations ? Can we avoid feeing when we open our eyes, or feeling when an objeft touches us ? Secondly, Are not therefore all our ideas perfe6lly paf- five and inert, including nothing of a6lion in them ? Thirdly, And are fenfible qualities “ any thing elfe but ideas ? Fourthly, And is not motion a fenfible quality? Fifthly, Con- fequently no aftion/' ‘ To each of thefe inquiries our author makes his antagonift aflent, and the conclufibn is undeni- able ; but we cannot extend our complaifance fo far. Admitting the firft pofition, the fecond is no confequence ; we are paflive in receiving our ideas, pur ideas are not therefore paftive; paflion implies aftion, and the idea is the aftion, of which we are the paflive fubjeds. The marble is paflive in the hands of the ftatuary, but it is by means of aftions it aflumes various figures. Thus the very firft ftep from the premifes is erroneous. The next Are fenfible qualities any thing elfe but ideas.” We have fhewn that fome fenfible qualities are external objeftsof fenfe, not ideas, and among thefe, motion is one: